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ARTICLE
THE CULTURE OF SCIENCE AND THE
REGULATION AND LITIGATION OF
BIODEFENSE RESEARCH
VICTORIA SUTTON*
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The headlines of the local newspaper in a West Texas city of about
200,000 population read “Professor Admits to Lie About Plague” followed
by the statement that “the world renowned researcher who turned an inter-
national spotlight on Lubbock with claims of missing samples of plague
admitted Wednesday to federal authorities that he lied about what happened
to the bacterial agent, court records show.”1
The impact of this news on January 13, 2003 was nationwide. Within
hours of the report of the stolen or missing plague to the FBI, the President
of the United States was briefed about the possible biocrime. On the finan-
cial front, cattle and pork futures plummeted. The futures reached a “limit
down” status, meaning that the exchange halted trading for the day because
the market had reached its limit established for a decrease in value for one
day. For one month’s contracts, the drop resulted in a loss of $1,049 per
steer for April 2003 contracts.2 Although plague does not affect cattle or
* Professor Victoria Sutton, MPA, PhD, JD is the Robert H. Bean Professor of Law, and
the Director of the Center for Biodefense, Law and Public Policy, Texas Tech University School
of Law. She has served as consulting attorney on several high-profile laboratory biosafety and
biosecurity cases, and to state and federal agencies and international organizations. She teaches a
course, Biosecurity Law, and directs the Biosafety and Biosecurity Law Hotline for legal ques-
tions concerning compliance for laboratory biosecurity and biosafety and transportation. She has
published widely in the field of biodefense law, including Law and Bioterrorism (Carolina Aca-
demic Press, 2002); and Biosecurity Law (Carolina Academic Press, forthcoming).
1. Kerry Drennan, Professor Admits to Lie About Plague, THE LUBBOCK AVALANCHE-J.
(Texas), Jan. 17, 2003, at A1.
2. All cattle contracts were down, but April, June, and October contracts were down the
limit allowed, which represented the cattle most ready for market, on Wednesday, January 15,
2003. In a telephone interview in March 2003 with analyst Dave Weaber of Cattlefacts in Denver,
CO, Weaber said that the fed cattle futures continued to decline, but June contracts had recovered
half of what was lost and October had recovered one-third of what was lost the day of the an-
nouncement. He thought that the announcement of the missing plague could account for some, but
not all, of the decline in the markets on that day.
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pork, the perception of how it would affect the cattle market in the Panhan-
dle of Texas was clearly important in the financial market. The impact was
felt locally, too. Local residents telephoned the FBI and the local Depart-
ment of Public Health with concerns about their safety. Hours after the an-
nouncement, the FBI announced that the plague had been located, and the
fear subsided. After almost two years, Dr. Thomas Butler, the plague scien-
tist, had lost his license to practice medicine and was checking into a fed-
eral prison in Ft. Worth, Texas for a two-year term.
Biodefense researchers were saddened and angered to see a colleague
in handcuffs as he was taken into custody by the FBI—the result of almost
a decade of growing legislative reactions to the threat to public health and
national security, further fueled by the reality of the anthrax attacks of
2001. Another scientist, Professor John Rosenberger of the University of
Pittsburg, who otherwise had stellar and honorific careers in scientific re-
search, retired as part of a plea bargain in a criminal case against him for
violating the select agent regulations. Institutions of worldwide repute for
excellence in leadership in scientific research in dangerous pathogens—
Texas A&M University and USAMRIID, the U.S. Army’s biodefense re-
search institution—have been fined and/or suspended from all research in
these very areas. Scientists have been under scrutiny and investigated to the
extent that their careers have been negatively impacted. The highest profile
of these was Steven Hatfill who ultimately settled with the federal govern-
ment for around $5 million for being named a “person of interest” and pur-
sued relentlessly, disrupting his academic appointments and career.
The mere suggestion of a biodefense laboratory has driven communi-
ties to form organizations to protest their location, and litigation through
environmental statutes has been utilized in their effort. One non-profit or-
ganization, The Sunshine Group, was formed with an objective of investi-
gating the “proliferation” of biodefense laboratories in the United States as
a result of the increased capacity building for research following the anthrax
attacks of 2001.
After the five-year mark for implementation of the select agent regula-
tions in 2008, a legislative review of the program resulted in proposed legis-
lation. The objective was a complete review of the entire design of the
program, although consideration of the legislation was interrupted by the
presidential election in fall 2008. Some questions asked were: Is this a regu-
latory regime that can ensure the safety of the public and the security of our
homeland and nation? Do we have any other regulatory choices?
Prior to 1996, the biodefense research community had scientific ethics
as their guiding principle to limit research plans that went beyond those
boundaries. Indeed, the first generation of regulation of biodefense research
was directed not toward the scientist and the biological agents in the labora-
tory, but toward the interstate shipment of the biological agents with which
they worked. The Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Response and
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Preparedness Act of 2002, as well as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001,
created a second generation of regulations for the purpose of increasing
national and homeland security in an academic environment and expanded
the criminal provisions of the Bioterrorism Act, closing the gap between the
intentional act of bioterrorism and the violation of standards, now also po-
tentially criminal. In an effort to gain control of this scientific research com-
plex engaged in research with potential biological weapons, Congress
responded with new controls. Building upon an existing regulatory regime
of transportation of select agents, a new generation of regulations was
promulgated by the CDC from this legislation which added possession,
storage, and use of select agents. The culture of the research scientist and
the implementation of these regulatory mechanisms have led to a clash of
interests—those of research for humankind and those of national security.
Can these two interests co-exist? Which interest should yield to the other,
and to what degree, in an optimal, balanced regulatory system?
This article examines the historical development of the select agent
rules, the civil and criminal aspects of these rules, and how they have im-
pacted the biodefense research community, including those members who
have been found in violation of these rules. This examination of the devel-
opment of the select agent rules captures some of the contrasting interests
between the culture of science and the culture of law. This study can pro-
vide insight into the processes that drive science, which can be useful to
lawmakers and regulators and to those in the legal academy in the interdis-
ciplinary area of law and science. The development of environmental law
and regulation through the 1970s and 1980s provides a model for examin-
ing the new regime of regulation of biodefense research through the select
agent rules. Finally, this article considers whether the normative regulatory
processes effectively achieve the legislative goals of national and homeland
security in the area of life sciences biodefense research.
2.0 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF
SELECT AGENTS
The regulatory framework that requires the regulation of biological
agents which may be potential bioweapons began with a need to regulate
the transportation of biologics and pathogens.3 Since 9/11 and the anthrax
attacks of the fall of 2001, that regulatory framework was used to build a
new generation of regulations. These regulations have been shaped as a
result of incidents involving biological agents, moving Congress to act to
address the threat.
The first domestic law to address bioterrorism, the Biological Weap-
ons Anti-Terrorism Act, was passed in 1989. This law made it a crime to
3. 42 C.F.R. § 73.12–13 (2005), reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 5105 (2005).
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intend to use biological agents as a biological weapon.4 The law was passed
in part as an international obligation under the Biological Weapons Treaty
of 1972. However, the United States had already experienced its first mod-
ern biological attack in 1984, when a cult in Oregon poisoned salad bars in
the community with salmonella bacteria in an attempt to influence the out-
come of an election. This Biological Weapons Act required a criminal stan-
dard of “intent to use” any of a list of biologicals as weapons. Congress
took care in the construction of the statute to make criminal only those who
possessed biological agents “for other than peaceful purposes.” This placed
no limits on researchers who used these agents for typical research, and
indeed, it was Congress’s intent to avoid obstructing scientists in their
work.
In 1995 and 1996, Larry Wayne Harris obtained plague bacteria from
the American Type Culture Collection using letterhead from a laboratory.
This incident moved Congress to pass the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, which added that not only must the perpetrator
have “intent to use [biological agents] as a weapon . . .” but also “attempts,
threatens or conspires to do the same.”5 Larry Wayne Harris identified him-
self as a scientist6 which contributed to the concern that prompted Congress
to begin to regulate biological agents typically transferred by scientists in
laboratories and academic institutions to other researchers, rather than
merely making criminal the use or intent to use them as weapons.
The regulatory gap between possession of these agents and the attempt
to use them as weapons began to close when Congress created the select
agent regulatory framework.7 The select agent framework “represents a leg-
islative mandate to balance the regulatory oversight of agents and toxins
that have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety
while maintaining availability of these agents and toxins for research and
educational activities.”8 From 1996 until 2002, scientists could remain out
of the reach of regulation of these agents unless they chose to ship them.
Then, compliance with transportation labeling and notification requirements
would be required. In the 1996 publication of the final rules, the CDC re-
sponded to concerns from scientists that mere possession would be gov-
erned by the regulations. They responded that “[t]his final rule and
associated criminal penalties apply only to interstate and intrastate transfer
4. Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act § 175, 18 U.S.C. § 175 (2006).
5. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 511, 110
Stat. 1214, 1284 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §175 (2002)).
6. The Associated Press, Man Accused of Ordering Plague by Mail Found Guilty, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 22, 1997. (“I am a scientist. I am absolutely of no harm to anyone.”).
7. 42 C.F.R. § 73.12–13.
8. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 70 Fed. Reg.13,294, 13,297
(Mar. 18, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 73).
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of these agents. Possession of these agents is outside the scope of this final
rule . . . .”9
The anthrax attacks of 2001 following 9/11 prompted Congress to
close the gap between possession and criminal intent to use or attempt to
use a biological weapon. The USA PATRIOT Act criminalized the posses-
sion of an agent “of a type or in a quantity that, under the circumstances, is
not reasonably justified . . . .”10 The statute also added the expanded defini-
tion of weapon to include the development or possession of an agent “for
other than peaceful purposes.”11
The USA PATRIOT Act was effective immediately upon its passage
on October 23, 2001, and the first person was charged under the new rules
in November 2001. Tomas Foral, a graduate student at the University of
Connecticut was charged with possessing an agent for no “reasonably justi-
fied” purpose. While a graduate student at the University of Connecticut, he
was found in possession of anthrax from about October 27, 2001 until No-
vember 27, 2001. Foral was charged with “unlawfully retaining a portion of
the anthrax that had been discovered in October, 2001 at a University of
Connecticut research laboratory in Storrs. The charge [of] unlawfully pos-
sessing a biological agent carries a maximum term of incarceration of 10
years and a fine of as much as $250,000 . . . .”12
The second generation of the select agent rules was also set forth in the
USA PATRIOT Act. The new regulations required informational disclo-
sures, security background checks, security plans for laboratories, and regis-
tration of facilities and personnel where select agents were housed. This
second generation was an interim final rule in December 2002, and became
effective February 7, 2003.13 These rules effectively changed the culture of
biodefense research from one of fetterless freedom in the laboratory to one
of controlled security and accountability to a regulatory authority.
2.1 Mere Possession and Criminal Intent
In 1996, scientists feared that mere possession would make them
criminals, and indeed, Congress sought to limit the rules so as not to impede
legitimate research of scientists. The CDC assured scientists that
[t]his final rule and associated criminal penalties apply only to
interstate and intrastate transfer of these agents. Possession of
these agents is outside the scope of this final rule; however, [an]
individual in possession of a ‘biological agent or toxin . . . for use
9. Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed.
Reg. 55,190, 55,194 (Oct. 24, 1996) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 72).
10. 18 U.S.C. § 175 (2002).
11. Id.
12. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, (Nov. 19, 2002), available at http://round-
table.healthsafe.uab.edu/pdfs/doj_pr_11_19_02.pdf.
13. 42 C.F.R. § 73.6, 73.7, 73.10, 73.11, 73.12 (2008).
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as a weapon’ as defined in Title 18 of the U.S. Code, may be
subject to separate criminal penalties (18 U.S.C. 175 et seq.).14
The gap between the regulation for movement of select agents and the
intent to use them as weapons left many activities unregulated, ranging
from the work of a clandestine scientist to the legitimate work of the gov-
ernment scientist.
In 1996, scientists were concerned about the inadvertent or uninten-
tional mistake that could make criminals of scientists. In particular, the
question was raised to make the required mental state required for the crime
very clear. The criminal state of mind required to be convicted under the
rules governing select agents, the CDC explained, was found in two crimi-
nal statutes:
Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001 applies to false state-
ments made to the Federal Government in connection with the
rule. Such false statements may be made in connection with a
facility’s application to become a registered entity, completion of
CDC Form EA-101 for transfers of select agents, and in other
circumstances. To constitute a criminal violation, Section 1001
requires that the false statement be made “knowingly and will-
fully.” Other violations of the rule are covered under Title 42,
United States Code, Section 271. This violation is classified as a
misdemeanor and requires a “knowing” mental state by the defen-
dant. Thus, both of these criminal statutes subject offenders to
punishment for knowing conduct.15
Among the first to be charged under the criminal provisions of the new
post-9/11 regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 73, was Associate Professor Steven Kurtz
of the University of Buffalo. In 2004, Professor Kurtz was arrested for pos-
session of bacteria in his home. Professor Robert Ferrell, Department of
Human Genetics at the University of Pittsburg had supplied the bacteria to
Professor Kurtz, an artist who depicts biotechnologies in art forms. Kurtz
had asked Professor Ferrell for biological materials, and Ferrell ordered ser-
ratia marcescens and other innocuous bacteria.16 However, since the bacte-
ria was not a select agent, it did not fall within the scope of the select agent
regulation. Despite this discovery, the U.S. Attorney’s Office continued to
investigate the case against both Ferrell and Kurtz.
In another case, Professor John K. Rosenberger of the University of
Delaware, an expert in avian influenza, was charged with smuggling an
avian flu virus into Maine and then to a laboratory in Delaware in 1998.
Rosenberger pleaded guilty in September 2004 to violation of the select
agent rules. Although Rosenberger is recognized as an international author-
14. Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 55,194.
15. Id.
16. Serratia marcescens, a usually harmless bacteria, has a bright red color.
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ity on avian influenza virus, a felony conviction would permanently bar him
from ever working with any select agent again.
The select agent rules and the bioweapons criminal statute have effec-
tively closed the gap between the criminal and the mere possession of select
agents and potentially subject biodefense researchers to one or both of these
statutes, as illustrated in the preceding examples.
In addition to the select agent rules, the transportation of select agents
continues to be an important part of tracking biological agents. The trans-
portation requirements criminalize the failure to complete shipping papers,
the failure to mark shipments, and the failure to affix a Class 6.2 shipping
label indicating a biohazard. Imports are controlled by U.S. Customs and
exports must be permitted by the Department of Commerce.
It was the exportation of the plague bacteria which carried the longest
prison sentence for Professor Thomas Butler of Texas Tech University. The
unauthorized export of any commercially controlled item is criminal. One
of the disturbing parts of the case was that Dr. Butler had carried the plague
onto a commercial airline on which he was a passenger, in what was com-
monly referred to as the “VIP” (vial-in-pocket) technique. There was no
conviction for carrying plague in this manner, because there is no civil or
criminal penalty for this action under 42 C.F.R. § 72 since it was not put
into interstate shipment. Although 42 C.F.R. § 73 was in a notice and com-
ment period before becoming a final rule, the VIP issue was never ad-
dressed, and it remains an unclear violation of the interstate shipment
regulations under another title. If the CDC wishes to proscribe this behav-
ior, it should do so in an express rule which does not leave the regulated
community unsure about its prohibition.
The prohibition against certain types of experiments is another section
of the select agent program which attempts to limit the types of experiments
that might be done on biological agents which would make them more use-
ful as weapons.
3.0 THE NORMATIVE REGULATORY APPROACH
The normative approach to regulation begins with the triggering evalu-
ation of the need for a regulation, where “[i]t is essential to ascertain that
there is a legitimate market failure before determining that a regulation is
warranted.”17 Second, a cost-benefit analysis should be done; third, the pol-
icy choices should be cost-effective; and fourth, there should be balancing
of the benefits and costs of policies.18 However, the efforts to protect the
public health and safety from biological agents are not driven by market
17. W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK
249 (1992).
18. Id. at 249–51.
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failures but by social values, where “[t]he ultimate object of social regula-
tion policies is to influence health, safety, and environmental outcomes.”19
The normative approach to regulation and the economic theory of reg-
ulation may explain the 1996 initial regulations after the arrest of Larry
Wayne Harris, which focused on the regulation of the transportation of bio-
logical agents. Certainly, it was within the scope of the Commerce Clause
to regulate articles of commerce moving in interstate commerce. It internal-
ized previously externalized costs of risk to the public in the transportation
of select agents. However, the anthrax attacks in fall 2001 changed what
had been considered a negligibly low probability event to one with a real
probability and high consequences. The increase in the perception of the
risk triggered the need to create the new regulatory scheme. The economic
theory of regulation would continue to drive the interest in research, but the
government became an important participant in the market by regulating
itself in national laboratories, as well as the academic and private sector.
Social regulation might seek to internalize previously externalized
costs. For example, environmental regulation of hazardous waste applies a
“polluter pays” principle, where the costs of disposal are paid by the gener-
ator rather than literally sending it down the river to devalue real property
values and the health of the downstream human inhabitants and
environment.
Normative approaches also seek to maximize existing models by
adapting them to new regulatory subjects. The second generation of select
agent rules was triggered by the post 9/11 experience of the anthrax attacks
in fall 2001. Within the legislative mandate in the 2002 legislation, the
CDC considered other models of regulation with similar objectives of pub-
lic health and safety. The models considered were the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) licensing model for regulating the use of radioactive
materials; the National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standardization
(NCCLS) certification program for hospitals; Institutional Biosafety Com-
mittees as utilized with the application of the NIH Recombinant DNA
Guidelines; the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Animal Plant and Health
Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) program to regulate the import and
transfer of restricted animal pathogens; the American Association for Ac-
creditation of Laboratory Animal Care (AAALAC) Program; and the CDC
program to permit the import of etiological agents.20
The regulatory approach of the federal government in carrying out the
legislative mandate to protect public health and safety from bioterrorism or
“biocarelessness” is one of oversight, targeting listed biological agents, fa-
cilities where they are located, and persons who have access. The target,
19. Id. at 285.
20. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 70 Fed. Reg.13,294, 13,294
(Mar. 18, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 73).
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biological agents, has some similarities to the effort to regulate hazardous
waste—namely, its quantity is unpredictable and requires self-reporting by
the generator. However, unlike hazardous waste, biological agents can be
multiplied by simply growing more of them, and they are stored in petri
dishes, slants, and test tubes, rather than fifty-five-gallon drums, making
detection a major distinction.
The economic theory of regulation stated by Judge Richard Posner
holds that “legislation is a good demanded and supplied . . . so that legisla-
tive protection flows to those groups that derive the greatest value from it,
regardless of overall social welfare . . . .”21 That is, legislative action works
like economics, driven by costs and benefits. This explains the regulatory
scheme for hazardous waste, where the regulated community in hazardous
waste is the industrial generator in the private sector. While the regulatory
scheme for hazardous waste may be considered to be part of the costs of
doing business, from an economics perspective, the regulatory scheme for
biological agents does not generate income to justify the increased costs of
“doing business” which is caused by this regulation. However, increases in
funding for biodefense research provide the economic incentive to continue
to participate in the regulatory scheme, by both the individual researcher
and the researcher’s institution.
The regulation also fails to internalize previously externalized costs,
like the Superfund legislation which forces the private chemical company to
pay for waste treatment rather than externalizing costs through property de-
valuation and health effects on people and animals. There are no demonstra-
ble external costs from select agents in a laboratory that have been
remedied by requiring internalized recordkeeping of quantities of them.
This incentive to continue and increase biodefense research has been
widely disclaimed in the popular science journals and media, citing instead
that the increased regulatory burden and security measures will cause bi-
odefense researchers to abandon this research. To the contrary, the CDC has
concluded in their cost/benefit analysis that there has been no loss of bi-
odefense research, and, if there had been, it would be highly speculative to
attempt to quantify it. In March 2005, in publishing the final rule for 42
C.F.R. § 73, the CDC had this comment:
We agree that the RIA [risk impact assessment] has not attempted
to quantify the value of lost research and other indirect institu-
tional effects [of the new select agent rules]. . . . First, based on
our experience with the pre-notification and registration process,
we believe there will be few instances where universities abandon
lines of research in response to the rule. Out of the 200 or so
entities that transferred or destroyed their select agents rather than
registering under the rule, we believe that the majority did so for
21. Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitu-
tion, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 265 (1982).
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reasons that do not threaten future research, as suggested by the
following three typical examples: (1) Researchers who already
have completed efforts under past research grants; (2) universities
that continue their select agent research but at fewer locations
within the university system; and (3) hospitals that had used se-
lect agents for purposes other than research (e.g., quality assur-
ance testing) but which can readily substitute other agents.
Second, even if an institution did discontinue its research, we ex-
pect that this research would not be “lost.” Instead, other universi-
ties likely would pick up these research lines, particularly
research efforts funded through grants. Therefore, any research
effects are likely to be small including, in particular, any shift of
knowledge on select agents to outside of the U.S. Third, to the
extent that any net reduction in research or other negative institu-
tional effects were to occur, quantification of these effects would
be highly speculative.22
So, it would seem the economic theory of regulation is consistent with
the select agent rules which target the researcher and the researcher’s
institution.
The CDC’s cost/benefit analysis of the regulation considered the costs
by first identifying the regulated community in the regulation: facilities and
persons with access. It estimated that not more than 817 institutions and
facilities are expected to register, and from 2,400 to 10,000 persons with
access are expected to be subject to the regulations.23 The CDC considered
that most of the entities seeking registration would already be “for the most
part in compliance with these regulations.” It attributes 60 percent of the
cost to be for “limiting access to select agents and work areas; developing
and implementing a security plan; developing and implementing a safety
plan; and obtaining risk assessments for existing staff.” The benefits are the
safety and prevention of financial loss from chaos caused from a release of
a select agent or toxin into the environment, whether accidental or
intentional.24
The regulatory approach sought by the CDC was a focus on the agents
themselves for protecting public health, and, interestingly, not the labora-
tory or the institution, which arguably is a more predictable regulatory tar-
22. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 70 Fed. Reg. at 13,294,
13,313–14.
23. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 67 Fed. Reg. 76,886,
76,894–95 (Dec. 13, 2002) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 73). This regulation applies predomi-
nantly to academic institutions and biomedical centers; commercial manufacturing facilities (the
pharmaceutical industry); federal, state, and local laboratories, including clinical and diagnostic
laboratories; and research facilities. Eight hundred seventeen facilities are expected to register and
an additional 350 entities are believed to be exempt. The range of numbers of people who have
access to select agents and toxins is from three (in small commercial or state facilities) to over 100
in large academic institutions.
24. Id. at 76,895–96.
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get than select agents which rely solely on self-reporting of their existence
and their quantities in order to be regulated. The CDC explained that they
considered the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s program to regulate radi-
oactive material as the target, but radioactive material is not self-replicating
like biological material.
4.0 A REGULATORY PROCESS
4.1 Constitutional Basis for Federal Regulation
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 authorizes
the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to regulate the transfer
of certain agents harmful to humans. The CDC is the agency within HHS
responsible for promulgating this regulation. This rule is designed to ensure
that select agents are not shipped to parties who are not equipped to handle
them appropriately or who otherwise lack proper authorization for their re-
quests, and to implement a system whereby scientists in research institu-
tions may continue transferring and receiving these agents without undue
burdens. Respondents include facilities such as those operated by govern-
ment agencies, universities, research institutions, and commercial entities.25
The USA PATRIOT Act broadened the bioterrorism crime. The Public
Health and Bioterrorism Preparedness Act of 2002 created the second gen-
eration of select agent rules.26
4.2 Choosing a Regulatory Target—What is Being Regulated?
Select agents also include its elements of pathogenicity. The regulated
select agents, as described in the comments with the final rule, also include
genetic elements from a select agent, that contain a nucleic acid
sequence(s) which, if inserted into an appropriate host system, are
reasonably believed capable of producing disease or toxicosis.
Genetic elements from a select agent that contains a nucleic acid
sequence(s) which, if inserted into an appropriate host system, do
not cause disease or toxicosis are not subject to the final rule.27
“Select agent” is defined as “a microorganism (virus, bacte-
rium, fungus, rickettsia) or toxin listed in Appendix A of this part.
The term also includes: (1) Genetically modified microorganisms
or genetic elements from organisms on Appendix A of this part,
shown to produce or encode for a factor associated with a disease,
and (2) Genetically modified microorganisms or genetic elements
25. Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed.
Reg. 55,190, 55,196  (Oct. 24, 1996) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 72).
26. 42 C.F.R. § 73 (2005).
27. Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 55,195.
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that contain nucleic acid sequences coding for any of the toxins
on Appendix A of this part, or their toxic subunits.28
A select agent is selected for the list considering these four criteria:
(1) The effect on human health of exposure to the agent or
toxin; (2) the degree of contagiousness of the agent or toxin and
the methods by which the agent or toxin is transferred to humans;
(3) the availability and effectiveness of pharmacotherapies and
immunizations to treat and prevent any illness resulting from in-
fection by the agent or toxin; and (4) any other criteria, including
the needs of children and other vulnerable populations, that the
Secretary considers appropriate.29
4.3 Genetic elements, Recombinant Nucleic Acids and Recombinant
Organisms
The interim final rule also regulated genetic elements, recombinant nu-
clei acids and recombinant organisms as select agents and toxins, where:
(1) Select agent viral nucleic acids (synthetic or naturally de-
rived, contiguous or fragmented, in host chromosomes or in
expression vectors) that can encode infectious and/or replica-
tion competent forms of any of the select agent viruses.
(2) Nucleic acids (synthetic or naturally derived) that encode for
the functional form(s) of any of the toxins listed in paragraph
(d) of this section if the nucleic acids:
(i) Are in a vector or host chromosome;
(ii) Can be expressed in vivo or in vitro; or
(iii) Are in a vector or recombinant host genome and can be
expressed in vivo or in vitro.
(3) Viruses, bacteria, fungi, and toxins listed in paragraphs (a)
through (d) of this section that have been genetically
modified.30
  Even this description is inadequate to address the rapidly changing sci-
ence with synthetic genomics and nanotechnologies which involve multi-
disciplinary laboratories, some of which are primarily engineering or phys-
ics laboratories and would not be subject to these regulations in some cases.
28. Id. at 55,199.
29. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,294, 13,296
(Mar. 18, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt 73) (“The Secretary directed the CDC to convene
an inter-agency working group to determine which biological agents and toxins required regula-
tion based on the criteria noted above. In June 2002, the CDC convened an interagency working
group to review the current list of select agents and toxins and develop recommendations for a
select agent list.”).
30. Id. at 13,298.
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4.4 The Exemptions
4.4.1 The Attenuated Strain Exemption
Attenuated strains may be exempted from regulation.31 This permits
the opportunity for the select agent to be shipped, possessed, or utilized in a
laboratory and escape regulation. Attenuated strains are further required to
not be “a threat to public health” in order to qualify for this exemption. This
might presumably exclude any form of smallpox, although it is not specifi-
cally excluded. This further qualification requires a risk assessment in order
to determine whether the attenuated strain is not a threat to public health,
but the regulations do not specify how this determination is made. Although
this is intended to be helpful to clinical diagnostic laboratories, it provides a
regulatory gap for misuse of these materials.
4.4.2 Prion Agents
The CDC decided to exclude prion agents from regulation, notwith-
standing the comments that these prions could impact the success of public
health programs. Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease and Kuru were two prions that
were identified as possible select agents, but the agency declined to include
them on the list32—notwithstanding the fact that Richard Preston, in his
novel, The Cobra Event, featured the Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease as a com-
ponent of an engineered bioweapon that was said to have inspired President
Clinton to begin the new department, DTRA, in the Department of Com-
merce to fund countermeasures to bioterrorism and other forms of
terrorism.33
31. Id. (“The Act sets the criteria for excluding attenuated strains, i.e., they may be excluded
if they do not pose a severe threat to public health and safety, (42 U.S.C. 262a(a)).”).
32. Id. at 13,296 (“One commenter asserted that the Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease and Kuru
agents should be added to the list of HHS select agents and toxins. The commenter noted that the
‘Arguments for omission include the difficulty of obtaining these agents, the extreme difficulty of
replicating them, low infectivity by the oral route, and the absence of person-to-person infectiv-
ity.’ The commenter then argued that they should be included based on the conclusions ‘that a
single real or claimed incident of contaminating a childhood vaccine with a prion would cause
indescribable anguish’ and that ‘The difficulty of confirming or refuting a claim that prions had
been added to a vaccine would cripple most legitimate public health programs and result in
epidemics of preventable diseases.’ The commenter concluded by stating that ‘In my judgment,
the remote but extreme risk fully justifies the cost of including prions that are infectious to
humans.’ We made no changes based on this comment. Based upon the criteria that the HHS
Secretary must consider, it was the consensus of the Secretary’s Select Agent and Toxin Working
Group that Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease (CJD) and Kuru agents should not be added to the list
because the degree of contagiousness of prions are too low to pose a significant mass casualty
threat. While they are infectious under some circumstances, such as cannibalism in New Guinea
causing Kuru or Creutzfeldt-Jacob Disease by the consumption of infected bovine central nervous
system tissue, there is no evidence of contact or aerosol transmission of prions from one human to
another.”).
33. Judith Miller & William J. Broad, Exercise Finds U.S. Unable to Handle Germ War
Threat, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1998, § 1, at 1.
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Exempting prions is not qualified by the risk to public health, and
therefore creates another gap in regulation, including the laboratory security
requirements of 42 C.F.R. § 73.
4.5 The Exceptions
4.5.1 The Clinical Specimen Exception
The largest gap in the select agent rules is the clinical specimen excep-
tion, which permits clinicians to transport any specimens from patients
without falling within the scope of the select agent rules. A clinician who
takes fluid from a bubo of a bubonic plague victim knows almost certainly
that the specimen contains plague, but because it is not analyzed as such, it
is still a clinical specimen under the regulation. Knowing this, one com-
menter to the regulations in 42 C.F.R. § 72 “wanted to know if tissue sam-
ples that only contain small amounts of the agent or that may only be
suspected of containing a pathogen would be covered by the final rule.”34
The CDC responded by focusing on the suspected material, but added again
the exception language: “All materials that are known or reasonably sus-
pected of containing a select agent, including tissue samples, unless ex-
empted as a human or veterinary clinical specimen, are subject to this
regulation.”35 This signaled an implicit agreement by the agency that such a
broad exemption should exist for a specimen even though it might be sus-
pected of containing a select agent, presumptively to avoid the burden to
clinicians who are treating patients and may or may not be involved in
research.
4.5.2 Laboratory Exception
A second exemption for facilities exists for CLIA laboratories which
are certified to diagnose diseases and may possess select agents as a refer-
ence sample for verification of their test.36 However, one of the most signif-
icant accidents since the promulgation of these new regulations was the
CLIA laboratory receipt of a mistaken shipment of a non-virulent strain of
influenza for use as a diagnostic. The CLIA laboratories were the recipients
of a virulent flu strain (virulent by mistake) which was sent throughout the
United States as a reference sample to confirm the existence of flu. These
laboratories were exempt from the security requirements of regulated labo-
34. Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed.
Reg. 55,190, 55,191 (Oct. 24, 1996) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 72).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 55,196 (“(2) Exemption of CLIA certified laboratories: Clinical laboratories certi-
fied under the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, (42 U.S.C. 263a) (CLIA),
that utilize these select agents for diagnostic, reference, verification, or proficiency testing pur-
poses are exempt from the provisions of § 72.6.”).
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ratories, and all quality control measures were outside the scope of the
regulation.
4.5.3 Natural Environment Exception
The third exception provides a gap in the select agent rules which
would allow the would-be terrorist to remain undetected among a menag-
erie of animals which might provide a living laboratory for the terrorist. The
final rule states that a select agent or toxin under these rules does not in-
clude any select agent or toxin that is “in its naturally occurring environ-
ment provided it has not been intentionally introduced, cultivated, collected,
or otherwise extracted from its natural source.”37 The CDC provides some
examples of this natural infection: “Select agents in their naturally occur-
ring environment could include animals that are naturally infected with a
select agent or toxin (e.g., macaques that are naturally infected with
Cercopithecine herpesvirus 1 or milk samples that contain Coxiella burne-
tii.”38 If the animal is intentionally collected, then the would-be terrorist
could not legally house these animals because of presence of the disease—
for example, a prairie dog carrier of bubonic plague or tularemia. An antibi-
otic resistant plague could be created among the animals without ever ex-
tracting the plague bacteria and the prairie dogs could be sold as pets,
launching an outbreak of tularemia and plague.39 However, if it is the inten-
tional collection of the select agent or toxin that the rule precludes, then
keeping the animals poses no violation.
The CDC explains the rule that it is the extraction of the select agent or
toxin by taking tissue from the animal rather than the collection of the
animal that is the violation:
However, a select agent or toxin that has been intentionally intro-
duced, cultivated, collected, or otherwise extracted from its natu-
ral source, including tissues from animals or agents or toxins
obtained from milk samples that have been naturally infected with
a select agent or toxin, is subject to this part . . . .40
But discovery of the presence of a select agent or toxin in the animals
is not required by the CDC unless the discovery was made due to the inten-
tional acts described above.
Any individual or entity that intentionally extracts and discovers that a
select agent exists is then required to report it to the CDC: “[I]n such a case
37. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 70 Fed. Reg.13,294,
13,298–99  (Mar. 18, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 73).
38. Id. at 13,299.
39. There was an outbreak of tularemia from pet prairie dogs reported to the CDC which
required treatment of all those exposed and the destruction of potentially infected animals over
several states. This could have been similar to a would-be terrorist attack, and might have been
suspected as one, if the prairie dogs had been randomly placed in several states, for example.
40. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 70 Fed. Reg. at 13,299.
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the entity is required to report the select agent or toxin upon identifica-
tion.”41 This explanation fails to describe how that reporting entity would
avoid prosecution under other parts of the rule which require registration of
the facility and safety plans, as well as security risk assessments of all those
who have contact with the select agents. The possibility of such an entity
making such a report is practically nonexistent without further explanation
by the CDC that there would be no penalty for doing so.
4.6 Failure to Exempt the Disclosures from FOIA
4.6.1 Information for the Public
The collection of information by the federal government inevitably
leads to the question of its accessibility by the public through the Freedom
of Information Act (FOIA). During the comment period for the 1996 regu-
lations which established a list of registered facilities, concerns were raised
about the availability of a list of institutions housing select agents. The con-
cern was that such “a publicly available list of registered facilities would
serve as a ‘roadmap’ to would-be terrorists of facilities possessing these
dangerous agents.”42 Another concern was that the database and transfer
forms may contain proprietary information.43 This information was not ex-
empted from FOIA. Instead the burden was on the submitter to pursue legal
action to prevent the release of the information upon notification to the
submitter that the information had been requested.44
Further, the FOIA exception did not protect information that might be
a threat to the security of the laboratory where select agents are stored in the
case where public institutions are regulated by state open records statutes,
and although the information at federal agencies may be protected, the state
institution itself may be required to disclose almost limitless records on the
storage, location, and amounts of select agents that may be in a state institu-
tion. For example, the University of Texas was sued by the Texas Attorney
General for failing to disclose information about its select agent program
pursuant to a state open records request by the non-profit organization, The
Sunshine Group. The Texas legislature has introduced legislation to provide
for an exception to the open records act in order to protect information that
might be a threat to laboratory security.
It is clear from published statements from the CDC that it considers
the identification of location to be a possible threat to security. For exam-
ple, it has given facilities the option of posting a sign on the door of the
41. Id.
42. Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed.
Reg. 55,190, 55,194 (Oct. 24, 1996) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 72).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 55,195.
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laboratory describing what select agent is stored inside, if the entity be-
lieves it may be a threat to security.45
5.0 THE LABORATORY AS THE REGULATORY TARGET
The National Committee for Clinical Laboratory Standardization (NC-
CLS) model for certifying hospitals, or the American Association for Ac-
creditation of Laboratory Animal Care (AAALAC) Program model would
have targeted the facility and made institutions rather than researchers and
select agents the target.
Although the CDC considered the Institutional Biosafety Committees
(IBCs) as utilized with the application of the NIH Recombinant DNA
Guidelines, violation of these guidelines results in loss of federal funding
rather than criminal sanctions like the select agents rules. Should the IBCs,
whose members are employed by the institution, be utilized where conflict
would exist where facilities and institutions are to be accountable and po-
tentially civilly liable under the select agent rules? The very problem of
self-reporting by the researcher would leave IBCs and their institutions
without knowledge of the existence of select agents, should the researcher
decide not to report. In fact, Thomas Butler in United States v. Butler, had
failed to disclose his possession of plague bacteria to university officials,
and it was not until he reported it as “stolen” that the institution became
aware of his activities which included possession of the bacteria in his labo-
ratory.46 His activities were presumably secret because of the financial ar-
rangements with pharmaceutical companies which were not disclosed to the
university, resulting in diversion of funds from the institution and, ulti-
mately, criminal penalties for Butler.
5.1 The Biological Safety Laboratory BSL Vagueness:
Incorporation of the BMBL. Some commenters questioned incor-
porating the BMBL into the regulation because, in their view, the
BMBL provides “guidelines” that are vague, and lack specificity
and sufficient detail. One commenter recommended that the
BMBL be augmented or updated to provide a clear objective stan-
dard. Because the BMBL serves as the only nationally and inter-
nationally recognized source for biosafety requirements for
laboratories, the final rule retains the incorporation of the BMBL.
The BMBL provides the minimum requirements for BL-2, 3, and
45. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 70 Fed. Reg. at 13,306 (“In
this final rule, 42 C.F.R. 73.12 (Biosafety) provides that an individual or entity should consider
the BMBL and NIH Guidelines when developing a biosafety plan. However, it is the entity’s
responsibility to determine if posting biohazardous signs on access doors would compromise labo-
ratory security.”).
46. United States v. Butler, 429 F.3d 140 (5th Cir. 2005).
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4 laboratories and animal facilities and is readily applicable to a
facility registration and inspection process.47
In a survey conducted in 2008 among biodefense researchers in the
U.S., almost half of the respondents would prefer clear guidance to the
vagueness of the BMBL, which is used as an enforcement tool rather than
as guidance. The other half wanted to leave the BMBL as it is currently
used. This suggests that, after five years of use, what might typically be
more acceptable as the status quo is questioned as unclear after more than
five years of implementation of this regulatory aspect of the rule.
A safety plan is also required by 42 C.F.R. § 73.12, which vaguely
refers to considering the incorporation of the BSL requirements.48 This can-
not be used as an enforcement tool without being subjected to the notice
and comment process of rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure
Act, which subjects the regulated community to enforcement without con-
stitutional requirement of due process.
6.0 WHAT IS THE OBJECTIVE OF THE REGULATION?
6.1 Public Health and National Security
Biosafety is a regulatory objective which attempts to regulate safe han-
dling and storage of the select agents. On the other hand, biosecurity is a
regulatory objective which attempts to safeguard the storage of select
agents from intentional or accidental access to unregistered individuals.
“National Security” as a goal of the statute is largely derived from the
description of the objectives of biosecurity, but it is explicitly mentioned in
the section of the rule requiring security risk assessments (SRAs), indicat-
ing that the purpose of the select agent rules includes a national security
goal. In comments to the regulation, former CIA Director Bobby Inman
wrote that “Science and national security have a symbiotic relationship . . . .
In the long history of that relationship, the suggestion is hollow that science
47. Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed.
Reg. at 55,191.
48. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 70 Fed. Reg. at 13,308 (“The
amended interim final rule provided that an entity subject to the part 73 regulations must develop
and implement a safety plan and in developing a safety plan, an entity should consider: ‘(1) The
biosafety standards and requirements for BSL 2, 3, or 4 operations, as they pertain to the respec-
tive select agents, that are contained in the CDC/NIH publication, “Biosafety in Microbiological
and Biomedical Laboratories” including all appendices except Appendix F. (2) The specific re-
quirements for handling toxins found in 29 CFR part 1910.1450, “Occupational Exposure to Haz-
ardous Chemicals in Laboratories” and/or 29 CFR part 1910.1200, “Hazard Communication,”
whichever applies and specific requirements for handling toxins found in Appendix I in the CDC/
NIH publication, “Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories.” (3) For provisions
of the safety plan relating to genetic elements, recombinant nucleic acids and recombinant orga-
nisms, the “NIH Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules,” (NIH Guide-
lines). This includes, among other things, provisions regarding risk assessment, physical
containment, biological containment, and local review and applies to all recombinant DNA re-
search, regardless of funding.’”).
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might (or should somehow) be kept apart from national security concerns,
or that national security concerns should not have an impact on ‘scientific
freedom.’”49
One of the more controversial areas of the regulation has been the
“access” definition, a feature of meeting the biosecurity goal of the statute.
6.2 Who Has Access?
During the rulemaking process, comments about the meaning of “ac-
cess” in 42 C.F.R. § 73.10 that were received before the final rule was pub-
lished on March 18, 2005, indicated that “the use of the terms ‘area’ and
‘access’ were confusing. Thus the term ‘area’ was eliminated unless it is in
clear context.”50 The rule was evidently still vague because the agency ad-
ded an explanation that “[a]n individual will be deemed to have access at
any point in time if the individual has possession of a select agent or toxin
(e.g. ability to carry, use, or manipulate) or the ability to gain possession of
a select agent or toxin.”51
In response to comments, the agency described who was an unautho-
rized person who could not have access and explained that “unauthorized
persons are those unescorted individuals who do not have access approval
from the HHS Secretary or Administrator and who are in areas where they
could gain access to select agents or toxins.”52 This gave some guidance in
that every individual would require an escort, but was problematic for
cleaning personnel or maintenance personnel and raised a question as to
what extent they required escorts. To address this regulation, many cleaning
companies became specialized and obtained clearances for cleaning person-
nel who then became authorized to have access to select agents for security
purposes; from a practical perspective, though, they had no training for bi-
osafety aspects of having access to select agents.
6.3 Security Risk Assessments for Those Who Have Access
Security risk assessments (SRAs) are required for individuals who are
authorized and have access to select agents. The CDC refused to make
changes based on the commenters’ assertions during the comment phase of
the regulatory process, which asked for the portability of registrations so
that scientists could conduct research at multiple institutions, part of the
culture and practice of biological research.53 Sometime after the final publi-
49. Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, Federal Restraints on Research, IEEE SPECTRUM, May
1982, at 60.
50. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 70 Fed. Reg. at 13,295.
51. 42 C.F.R. § 73.10 (2005).
52. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 70 Fed. Reg. at 13,307.
53. Id. at 13,304 (“Commenters asserted that the regulations should allow security risk as-
sessment approvals for individuals to be portable from entity to entity, from location to location,
and from project to project. One commenter recommended that an individual’s clearance remain
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cation, the CDC agreed to this change, but only after rejecting the com-
ments initially and then acquiescing after publication.
However, the CDC, APHIS, and the U.S. Attorney General agreed that
an additional SRA was not needed where an individual was visiting another
facility to work with select agents. However, the “Responsible Official “of
the destination facility was required to write a letter to clarify this approval
and to note that the individual has a current SRA. The host institution was
then required to amend their registration accordingly.
However, the CDC, APHIS, and the Attorney General have agreed to,
and have already implemented, a policy where an additional security risk
assessment is not needed in cases where an individual has a current security
risk assessment and will be merely visiting another entity.54 This exces-
sively burdensome requirement ensured that the time to acquire such an
approval was often long after the need for the individual to visit had passed,
making this largely an unworkable policy.
6.4 Who Cannot Have Access:
The biosecurity aspect of the regulations regarding access derives its
authority from the bioterrorism criminal statute prohibiting possession or
use of biological weapons. This rule also defines who should be “restricted
persons” that are denied access to select agents.55 These criteria are sub-
stantively the same as for those required to have a permit to buy a firearm,
suggesting again that the normative approach to regulation was taken by
regulators, i.e., to utilize an existing model of regulation which sought to
protect public safety. However, the regulation, as is the case with handgun
control, may not meet the goals and objectives of the legislation.56
valid if the scientist moves to another institution as long as the scientist’s new employer amends
its registration document promptly to include the individual. The commenter also recommended
‘that the Department clarify that an individual’s clearance will continue to be valid if his or her
laboratory is relocated among any of the facilities under the oversight of the entity’s Responsible
Official“ and added that ‘The change in location should, of course, be reflected in a timely amend-
ment of the entity’s registration.’ We made no changes based on these comments.”).
54. Id. (“If a registered entity wants a visiting individual to have access to select agents or
toxins, the RO of home entity will have to send to the RO of host entity a letter stating that the
individual is currently identified on the home entity’s Select Agent registration and that the indi-
vidual has a current SRA approval. The host entity RO can then submit this letter and an amend-
ment to their registration. Once the visit is complete, the host entity would then amend their
registration to remove the visiting individual’s name. In some circumstances the host entity may
decide to leave the individual on the registration, if the same individual will be visiting the entity
again. Specific guidance on the process has been made available to the public on the Select Agent
Program web site. In addition, in this final rule, we have added the requirement that an individual
with access to select agents or toxins must have the appropriate education, training, and/or experi-
ence to handle or use such agents or toxins. We believe this requirement is necessary to ensure
that the individual has the appropriate education, training, and/or experience to handle such agents
or toxins.”).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 175b (2005).
56. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 70 Fed. Reg. at 13,305
(“[The commenters] argued that the term ‘restricted person’ would cover an individual who re-
\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-3\UST302.txt unknown Seq: 21 15-JAN-10 9:31
2009] THE CULTURE OF SCIENCE 543
7.0 PROHIBITIONS ON CERTAIN TYPES OF RESEARCH
The dual-use dilemma, which refers to biological research which can
be used for both benevolent as well as malevolent purposes, and bioethics
underlie the objectives of the prohibition on certain types of research in
addition to the goals of biosafety and biosecurity. Targeted in 42 C.F.R.
§ 73 is the prohibition of certain types of research with select agents. In
1996, the CDC explained that
[t]he deliberate transfer of a drug resistance trait to microorga-
nisms listed in this Appendix that are not known to acquire the
trait naturally is prohibited by NIH ‘Guidelines for Research In-
volving Recombinant DNA Molecules,’ if such acquisition could
compromise the use of the drug to control these disease agents in
humans or veterinary medicine.57
The amended interim final rule for 42 C.F.R. § 73 in 2003 stated that
“an entity may not conduct certain experiments unless approved by the
HHS Secretary after consultation with experts.” No specific body of experts
was identified, and the agency left open the flexibility to consult any expert
“as needed for decision making” and that they would “consult with subject
matter experts as necessary.”58
The normative approach is simply utilizing existing models for regu-
lating select agent use. The CDC used the IRB model of reviewing DNA
experimentation to apply to experiments in biodefense, and indeed, from
the CDC explanation, it is clear that they consider this to be nothing more
than an extension of the scope of experimentation monitoring of recombi-
nant DNA research. The regulatory goal of the DNA monitoring model is to
protect public safety and prevent unethical and unscientific research from
being funded or supported by the institution. The goal of the select agent
experimentation is also to protect public health and safety; but in contrast to
the DNA experimentation concerns, the biodefense research is also intended
to prevent the creation of dangerous knowledge which could be acquired by
bioterrorists in their efforts to develop weapons with regard to not only a
public health risk, but a national security risk. Is the IRB model appropriate
for the protection of national security interests as well as public health
interests?
ceived a dishonorable discharge from the U.S. military for homosexuality and could not under-
stand how precluding such individual from ever working on select agents would protect the
security of the United States. Commenters also argued that ‘it is predictable that some individuals
who are currently productive, respected members of the scientific community and who have per-
formed work with select agents or toxins meet one or more of the definitions of a ‘restricted
person.’ We made no changes based on these comments.”).
57. Additional Requirements for Facilities Transferring or Receiving Select Agents, 61 Fed.
Reg. 55,190, 55,200 (Oct. 24, 1996) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 72).
58. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 70 Fed. Reg. at 13,308–09.
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One of the inherent problems with biodefense research is the need to
build organisms on which to experiment to determine the efficacy of antibi-
otics. This would necessitate the building of organisms with potentially an-
tibiotic resistant characteristics, and is a typical approach to determining
efficacy at the earliest stage of countermeasures research. Potentially, this
would be prohibited under this regulation and would require an extensive
review process. Comments made during the comment phase indicated that
this was a problem, but the CDC again refused to make any changes to the
rule.59
The normative approach utilizing existing models used the IRB model
of reviewing DNA experimentation to apply to experiments in biodefense.
The regulatory goal of the DNA monitoring model is to protect public
safety and prevent unethical and unscientific research from being funded or
supported by the institution. The goal of the select agent experimentation is
also to protect public health and safety, but in contrast to the DNA experi-
mentation concerns, the goal of the effort is to place “stringent scrutiny” on
these areas of research. The “stringent scrutiny” explained by the agency is
to provide for the future experimentation that they may not have contem-
plated. Commenters also suggested additional kinds of research that should
be restricted, but the agency declined to add these experiments.60
Although the CDC indicated that they would propose new rules for
additional experiments in 2005, as of this date no proposal has been made
for consideration of additional kinds of prohibited experiments. The expla-
nation was simply that they would continue to “study” these kinds of exper-
iments and what “should be added to § 73.13. Experiments will be proposed
for addition to the listing of restricted experiments as warranted, through
the publication of a proposed amendment for public comment.”61
One commenter questioned whether the HHS secretary could limit or
proscribe research: The CDC responded:
59. Id. at 13,309 (“The commenter asserted that if strictly imposed, the restricted experiment
provisions would limit this standard research practice and provided an example concerning antibi-
otic resistance application. The commenter stated ‘Transposon insertion libraries are common ex-
perimental creations used to generate gene knockouts and study the effect on expression and
phenotype’ and ‘this often results in an array of genomes containing antibiotic resistance markers
used for selection and screening.’ The commenter then argued that ‘The method is common
enough not to need approval from a cabinet level position and too burdensome if approval is
needed for each of several thousand insertional mutants that would be created for a single gen-
ome.’ We made no changes based on this comment.”).
60. Id. (“One commenter argued that the following experiments should be added to the re-
served paragraph based on the conclusion that they warrant such stringent scrutiny (i.e., should be
allowed only if approved by the HHS Secretary after consultation with experts): (1) Experiments
involving construction of vaccine-resistant select agents or toxins. (2) Experiments involving in-
creasing the environmental stability of select agents or toxins. (3) Experiments involving powder
or aerosol production of select agents or toxins (other than preparation of lyophilized reference
specimen <10 mg). (4) Experiments involving powder or aerosol dispersal of select agents or
toxins.”).
61. Id.
\\server05\productn\U\UST\6-3\UST302.txt unknown Seq: 23 15-JAN-10 9:31
2009] THE CULTURE OF SCIENCE 545
We believe we have such authority. In this regard, the Act at 42
U.S.C. 262a(c) states that the “Secretary shall by regulation pro-
vide for the establishment and enforcement of standards and pro-
cedures governing possession and use of listed agents and
toxins . . . in order to protect public health and safety.62
8.0 WHAT WILL THE THIRD GENERATION OF SELECT AGENT
REGULATION LOOK LIKE?
An effort will be made to fill the existing gaps. Although the coverage
of the regulation extends to both the private sector and the public sector,
there is no regulation of laboratories that supply the biological agents in the
first place. The first order of business should be to target the source of the
biological agents. For example, when a suspect is being investigated who
has possession of a biological agent, the first priority is to find the source or
supplier which is often one of the supply laboratories like American Type
Culture Collection. Three of the four incidents with biological agents de-
scribed in this article show that the biological agents were obtained from
somewhere other than the suspect’s own laboratories: Larry Wayne Harris,
Prof. Robert Ferrell, and Prof. John K. Rosenberger. Two of these three
received the biological agents from a supply laboratory—American Type
Culture Collection.
There are an estimated 453 laboratories in the world in 67 countries
which supply biological agents. Not only will they ship ordinary biological
supplies, but eighteen of these laboratories will ship, for example, bubonic
plague samples. Keeping these channels open for academic research is vital
to the worldwide research community. The United States controls the im-
portation of select agents through 42 C.F.R. § 73.16(iii), while U.S. Cus-
toms has regulatory authority over importation permits. The inability to
control the supply laboratories outside of the United States ensures a steady
supply for any purchaser.
The CDC registration process as a condition of receiving U.S. funding
for international laboratories is a foray into the international arena. The next
step might be to partner with the World Health Organization (WHO), which
has developed laboratory biosecurity guidelines, to create a laboratory re-
gistration process which would be a prerequisite for U.S. funding.
9.0 ANALYSIS OF REGULATIONS
The select agent rules are enforcement-intensive and therefore re-
source-intensive. This administratively burdensome design does not make
this model useful to less wealthy countries seeking appropriate biosafety
and biosecurity regulatory models. The benefit of predictability and notice
about how one is being regulated is also a weakness of this regulatory
62. Id.
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model. The problems of modeling an inventory program of biological, self-
replicating organisms after a radiological inventory program are self-evi-
dent. Many of the enforcement examples have been related to this inventory
issue, making the regulatory system at risk of outweighing the benefit of its
burden. The most important information from the inventory rule is simply
the type of organism that is being inventoried and not the quantity, which is
largely irrelevant. This descriptive information, not quantitative informa-
tion, dictates the laboratory security level through the BMBL guidance and
the risk assessments of the individuals with access. In a national survey of
biodefense researchers in 2008, the researchers were given several choices
concerning the usefulness of the select agent inventory rule, and almost
one-quarter of the respondents thought that the regulation was not useful.63
The limiting of experiments is also vaguely unhelpful to national se-
curity. However, the fact that they are managed by the IBC makes this a
reasonable regulation with local accountability—both the individual and the
institution are responsible for experiments conducted. However, there are
no civil or criminal penalties for violating the experiments rule (only with-
holding of funding).
The institution as a target through the requirement for a security plan
and compliance with the BMBL guidance proves to be the most important
measure to protect public health and national security, yet the BMBL gui-
dance is incorporated only by reference to be “considered” by the entity or
individual in their security plans.64
10.0 CONCLUSION
Because compliance with the BMBL laboratory safety standards is suf-
ficient to gain NIH funding in other countries, the CDC must conclude that
this standard sufficiently protects public health and national security. If it is
sufficient for the safety of these laboratories, why is disclosure of select
agents and their ever-changing inventories required to make laboratories
safe, merely because they are located in the United States? Withholding
funding is a sanction which can be administered by NIH, and the one which
drives international laboratories to comply with the CDC’s requirements.
Yet, the CDC has chosen not to require compliance with select agent rules,
but only with BMBL standards.
The BMBL Guidance, based on specific proscriptive requirements, is
incorporated by reference to the regulation of select agents, but the viola-
tion of these requirements carries no penalties. The only penalty is loss of
federal funding, which leaves the private laboratory (which receives no
63. National Biodefense Research Survey, presentation, American Society of Microbiology,
February 2009, Baltimore, MD.
64. Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 70 Fed. Reg. 13,294, 13,306
(Mar. 18, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 73).
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CDC funding) with no economic incentive to comply with the proscriptive
requirements of the guidance. Future regulations will ultimately consider
incorporating the safety standards into the regulations, because it is the en-
vironment in which the biological agents are stored which directly relates to
the safety of the public.
Third, the clinical specimen exception has been a glaring hole in the
otherwise seamless domestic regulatory scheme. The clinical specimen,
often more likely than not to contain a select agent, requires no advance
notice of transportation, registration of the person with access or registra-
tion of the facility, or transportation permits or import or export permis-
sions. Clearly, the withdrawal of fluids from buboes of a bubonic plague
patient, before confirmation, has such a high likelihood of being positive
that applying this sweeping clinical specimen exception simply invites un-
regulated shipment of dangerous pathogens. This sweeping exception of
clinical laboratories is an example of the rule of “agency capture,” where
the regulated community “captures” the agency and the agency begins to
meet the demands of the regulated community in order to avoid unwanted
political pressure.
Fourth, the exemption of select agents in the natural environment
would allow the fringe operator to maintain a living laboratory without fall-
ing into the scope of either the select agent rules or the crime of bioterror-
ism. The technology to obtain anthrax or other select agents from the
natural environment leaves this wide gap in the control of select agents.
Fifth, restricted experiments are already controlled by scientific ethics
which, if violated, may result in suspension of grant funding. The restricted
experiments rule adds little to the existing regime. The notion of academic
freedom does not imply that there can be no constraints on activities, but
these activities must conform to a standard of professional methods and
conduct within the discipline of the research which may include a code of
ethics and restrictions on behavior.
11.0 RECOMMENDATIONS
The normative approach—identifying the target of regulation as “se-
lect agents” and developing a performance-based or standards-based regula-
tion to control them, first in transportation, then within the laboratory—
relies too much on the normative as a measure of success rather than on true
workability in the regulated community. When the gaps in the regulation
are examined, the dual goals of public health and safety and national secur-
ity should be the focus rather than the ease of enforcement for the regula-
tors. One of the goals thwarted by this regulatory regime is the need for
scientists to collaborate freely with colleagues nationally and internationally
to achieve the objectives of biodefense countermeasures.
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Registering scientists to also allow portability of their registration was
a long-sought goal, which was eventually amended by the CDC. This was a
positive response to feedback from the regulated community, and allowed
any registered scientist to possess any of the select agents that may be on a
list as an appendix to their registration. However, the enforcement objective
of controlling select agents cannot be achieved by a system which cannot
account for the replication of biological organisms, which will ultimately
prove administratively infeasible and counterproductive to biodefense
goals.
Laboratory safety with specific BMBL guidelines should be extended
internationally contingent on funding to organizations that collaborate with
U.S. scientists.
The attached chart describes factors in several cases involving select
agents that are regulated by the select agent regulations. The commentary
suggests that even fully implementing the select agent regulations would
not have prevented any of these incidents. Given these weaknesses in the
regulation, the target of the regulation should be reconsidered. Rather than
making the select agent the target of the regulation, the commentary sug-
gests that a more effective target might be the facilities and the individuals
working with the select agents. More focus on specific regulations and cer-
tification of facilities without the vagueness of the guidance used as an en-
forcement tool would address the biosafety problem inherent in the design
of the regulations. The focus on better security risk assessments (SRAs) of
individuals who are then left to their own professional standards in working
and storing select agents within the framework of the facilities certification
is also suggested as a better target for the regulation and more likely to
achieve the goals of biosecurity and biosafety.
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